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Abstract
Based on five paradigmatic novels – and their respective film adaptations – presenting 
dystopic future societies where law presents itself as a mere instrument of control and 
social planning, without any ethical-humanist foundation, the present paper intends to 
discuss the relations between power, law, ideology and control of consciences. In the 
first section, of historical-theoretical character, the juridical-philosophical meanings of 
the words “utopia” and “dystopia” in literature and philosophy are analyzed. The second 
section contains the synopses and data of the books and their respective dystopian 
movies, 1984, Brave New World, Fahrenheit 451, A clockwork orange and A scanner darkly. 
These are used in the third section, that has a critical nature, in order to support and 
illustrate the analysis of present society and its juridical alienating project. The article 
concludes with a reflection on the need to humanize juridical orders.
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Resumo
Com base em cinco obras cinematográficas paradigmáticas que apresentam sociedades 
futuras distópicas e nas quais o direito se mostra enquanto simples instrumento de 
controle social, sem qualquer fundamentação ético-humanista, o presente artigo 
pretende refletir sobre as relações entre poder, direito, ideologia e controle das 
consciências. Na primeira seção, de caráter histórico-teórico, examina-se o sentido 
jurídico-filosófico dos termos “utopia” e “distopia” na literatura e na filosofia. Na 
segunda seção, são apresentadas as sinopses e os dados dos filmes distópicos – 1984, 
Admirável mundo novo, Fahrenheit 451, Laranja mecânica e O homem duplo – que serão 
utilizados na terceira seção, de feição crítica, para fundamentar e ilustrar a análise da 
sociedade atual e de seu projeto jurídico alienante, concluindo-se o trabalho com uma 
reflexão sobre a necessidade de humanização das ordens jurídicas.
Palavras-chave: Utopia, distopia, literatura, cinema e direito, contemporaneidade, crítica.
1 Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.  Av. João Pinheiro, 100, Bairro Centro, 30130-180, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brasil. 
Costa Matos  | Law, literature and cinema: an essay on dystopic movies
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 4(1): 40-47                                       41
Utopia and dystopia
 “Utopia” is an iterant term in Political Philoso-
phy which claims to evoke a sort of ideal society. Made 
up of two Greek terms, ou (οὐ, a Greek prefix of ne-
gation) and tópos (τóπoς, literally: place), it designates, 
therefore, a non-place, meaning the excellent society 
that, because of that very excellence, does not exist in 
the real world. According to Antônio Houaiss (2001), 
the term was first used in the Portuguese language in 
a work published in 1671, in the city of Lisbon, and had 
the curious title of School of truths open to the Princes 
in Italian language, by Father Luiz Juglares, from the Soci-
ety of Jesus, and translated accessible to all in the Portu-
guese language by D. Antonio Alvares da Cunha [Escola das 
verdades aberta aos Princepes na lingua italiana, por o Pe. 
Luiz Juglares da Companhia de Jesu, e patente a todos na 
Portugueza por D. Antonio Alvares da Cunha].2 In the Dic-
tionnaire de l’Académie, from 1798, the term assumes a 
clear political-juridical content, since it defines a “plan 
de gouvernement imaginaire”. However, long before this 
definition, the word “utopia” had become famous be-
cause of its creator, Thomas Morus, an English humanist 
who lived at the end of the 15th and the beginning of 
the 16th century and, in his homonymous work, pre-
sented the political project of the isle of Utopia, whose 
inhabitants enjoyed an egalitarian, liberal and fair juridi-
cal system (Morus, 2004).3 Besides Morus, the Italian 
philosopher Tommaso Campanella, author of  The city 
of the sun, from 1623, and the English philosopher Fran-
cis Bacon, author of the technical-scientific utopia The 
new Atlantis (posthumously published in 1627), were also 
great utopians of modernity. In the contemporary era, 
the Marxist position stands out among others, since for 
them utopias are unrealizable because they are not con-
nected to the concrete structural conditions of society, 
and that is the reason why they shouldn’t be considered. 
In contrast, Karl Mannheim and Ernst Bloch believe in 
the transformative potential of utopias, which are able 
to feed a desire for social changes and then to offer 
alternative ways to the actual political-juridical organiza-
tion. According to Mannheim, utopia is seen as unreach-
able only for a particular social structure. This is actually 
a revolutionary ideology which aims at transcending the 
historical situation and, through the effective action of 
social groups, reaching a level of social organization that 
the existing political-juridical institutions do not allow 
for (Mannheim, 1968).4 Aldo Maffey thinks that utopias 
are projections of desires not totally satisfied in par-
ticular historical situations, just like the gardens and 
oases that appear in A thousand and one nights of the 
Arabs stranded in the desert. Nevertheless, these pro-
jections will take on the status of political utopias only 
if they present an ideal to be realized by an organization 
in community which offers definitive solutions to the 
socioeconomic problems, supposing that the political 
utopian always refers to the best realizable world, not 
to the best world conceived of in a fanciful way, as the 
writers do (Maffey, 2000, p. 1285-1286). In reality, the 
many political utopias constitute an unrestricted bet on 
the power of human rationality, which, allied to the idea 
of progress, typical of the Age of Enlightment, would be 
able to guarantee to human societies fairer ways of so-
cial organization.
Still, there are political-juridical dystopias too. 
The Greek prefix dys (δυσ-) means “sick”, “ill”, “abnor-
mal”. According to a suggestion by François Ost, shown 
in his analysis of the sources of the legal imagery con-
tained in the works of Franz Kafka (Ost, 2005, p. 373-
382), dystopias would be upside down utopias, that is to 
say, bad utopias, imaginary societies where the condi-
tions of existence are much worse than those of real so-
cieties. It seems that the term “dystopia” was first used 
in 1868 by Greg Webber and John Stuart Mill in a speech 
at Britain’s Parliament.5 
The role played by law in dystopias is always 
outstanding, presenting itself as an eminently technical 
order, whose single role consists of guaranteeing the 
perpetuation of social domination. It’s even unnecessary 
to explain that dystopic societies are characterized by 
the lack of rights and fundamental guarantees. They are 
usually highly authoritarian or totalitarian. The main vic-
tim sacrificed on the altar of the still fictitious dystopic 
States is undoubtedly freedom. To better understand 
dystopia, let’s take the words of O’Brien, member of 
IngSoc (English Socialism, in newspeak), the single party 
that governs Oceania, the State imagined by George Or-
well in his novel 1984:  
Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are 
creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonis-
2 Data taken from Dicionário eletrônico Houaiss da língua portuguesa.
3 The first edition is from 1516 and its complete title in Latin is Libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia.
4 The first edition was published in 1929.
5 “It is, perhaps, too complimentary to call them Utopians, they ought rather to be called dys-topians, or caco-topians. What is commonly called Utopian is something 
too good to be practicable; but what they appear to favour is too bad to be practicable” (Oxford English Dictionary).
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tic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world 
of fear and treachery is torment, a world of trampling 
and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not 
less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in 
our world will be progress towards more pain. The 
old civilizations claimed that they were founded on 
love or justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our 
world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, 
triumph, and self-abasement. Everything else we shall 
destroy, everything. Already we are breaking down the 
habits of thought which have survived from before the 
Revolution. We have cut the links between child and 
parent, and between man and man, and between man 
and woman. No one dares trust a wife or a child or 
a friend any longer. But in the future there will be no 
wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their 
mothers at birth, as one takes eggs from a hen. The 
sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will be an 
annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We 
shall abolish the orgasm. Our neurologists are at work 
upon it now. There will be no loyalty, except loyalty to-
wards the Party. There will be no love, except the love 
of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except the 
laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy. There will be 
no art, no literature, no science. When we are omnipo-
tent we shall have no more need of science. There will 
be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There 
will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of 
life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. But 
always – do not forget this, Winston – always there 
will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing 
and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every mo-
ment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation 
of trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want 
a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a 
human face – for ever.
The distance between utopia and dystopia is 
small and can be just a matter of opinion. G. Kaleb states 
that “the utopian begins in love and finishes in terror” 
(Maffey, 2000, p. 1288). Once begun, utopias cannot be 
controlled. Many times they claim to free men or to 
make them happy, independently of their own will. The 
mission of every utopia consists of regenerating people, 
even if it is necessary to confront them and to impose 
this high destiny on them. This is the way that imper-
ceptibly takes us from utopia to its phantasmagoric 
twin, to its doppelgänger: dystopia. Therefore, in Plato’s 
so praised Republic, for example, there is no place for 
individual liberty (Platão, 2001). Let’s remember that 
Plato thinks that democracy is a corrupted form of gov-
ernment, a sufficient cause to reserve the direction of 
his ideal city to the wise persons, who would exercise 
power in an authoritarian way. Moreover, the Platonic 
State is similar to a sketch of the totalitarian State that 
the contemporary era has met, because it controls all 
aspects of social life, ranging from the children’s edu-
cation – who would be separated from their parents 
since tender childhood – to the allocation of individu-
als to their respective occupations and professions. 
This would be made by “objective” criteria established 
by the pólis, and not by the personal decision made by 
the interested parties themselves. This is an interesting 
detail that portrays very well the “ideal” republic for 
Plato: although he recognizes the fascination that poetry 
exercises over the citizens, the poets should be driven 
out of the city. According to Plato, the exile of poetry 
is rationally imposed by the fact that it is not useful to 
the State, nor to human life (Platão, 2001, X, 595a-608b, 
449-474). For a poet, the platonic pólis certainly would 
be a dystopia, not a utopia. 
Even more shocking than the Platonic republic 
would be the ideal city for Zeno of Citium, the founder 
of the austere Greek stoic school.6 According to this 
author, only wise people could bear the status of citi-
zens; the others should be reduced to the condition 
of slaves and treated as enemies. Informed by the ethic 
conceptions from cynicism – a Hellenistic philosophical 
current that harshly criticized the accepted standards of 
sociability and morality –, Zeno prohibits the construc-
tion of temples, gyms and stadiums. In the Zenonian city 
there wouldn’t be commerce or private property. Men 
and women should be dressed in the same way, dis-
playing their bodies whenever possible. As a matter of 
fact, women would be shared by everyone. To the sages 
everything would be allowed, even prostitution, rape, 
incest and cannibalism. However indecent these ideas 
might seem, Zeno and his second successor in the Stoic 
school, Chrysippus, justified them rationally. More than 
a political-juridical project, the Zenonian republic was 
a provocation to the decadent Greek pólis, that falsely 
inflated itself of a glory that it did not have since the 
submission to Alexander and later to Rome. 
However, dystopias weren’t a common literary 
genre in Antiquity and, obviously, neither Plato nor Zeno 
presented their government systems as negative reali-
6 Unfortunatly, The republic of Zeno is irreparably lost. Just a few fragments from this work are left and have survived for centuries. The information we lined up were 
compiled by Diogenes Laertius in the 2nd century of the Christian era and is contained in his famous treaty Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers. Cf. Diogène Laërce 
(2002, VII, 32-33, 27-28). For a contemporary reading of what has come to us from The republic of Zeno, cf. Matos (2009, p. 262-284) and Schofield (1999).
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ties. On the contrary: both in the Ancient and in the Me-
dieval or Modern world, social utopias multiply, some of 
them slipping into the most fantastic and daring dreams. 
A foretoken of what would be the post-modern dys-
topias can be found in the work of Donatien Alphonse 
François, the Marquis of Sade, whose curious political 
pamphlet One more effort, Frenchmen, if you would be-
come republicans (Sade, 1999) proposes an eroticized 
State where everybody should submit themselves to 
the others’ sexual caprices, initiating, then, a real time 
of liberty, when there would be no limit to the citizen’s 
sexual satisfaction, even if the pleasure of some of them 
might cost the life of the others. Sade thinks that the 
State must create and keep appropriated institutions for 
satisfying every kind of luxury, including incest, which, 
according to the French writer, turns the family’s bond 
tighter and the citizens’ love for their country more ac-
tive. In Sade’s republic there would be an absence of 
all kinds of religion and theism. In spite of its polemic 
facet, Sade’s political project proves to be naïve when 
compared to the totalitarian nightmares engendered in 
the 20th century, which is particularly full of dystopias. 
Even if delirious, Sade’s republic claimed to protect the 
individual from the despotic action of the State’s power.7 
Despite his reputation of being depraved and crazy, the 
brilliant Marquis was a real son of the 18th century, and 
even more of the French Revolution, which claimed to 
extinguish monarchical absolutism in the name of the 
public liberties of the citizen. If we follow closely Sade’s 
argumentation, we will see that the revolution of cus-
toms proposed by him has a clear purpose: to prevent 
men’s non-satisfied sexual impulses from becoming au-
thoritarian ways to exercise political power.  Accord-
ing to Sade, today’s unsatisfied libertine is tomorrow’s 
despot, who transfers to society his sexual frustrations 
under a kind of a tyrannical power. Hence, we should 
avoid becoming little dictators. The only way to avoid 
this would be to institutionalize the pleasures and all 
vices that accompany them. It is not necessary to say 
how this text of Sade pleased psychoanalysts, from 
Freud to Lacan. 
It’s important to notice, however, that Sade’s dys-
topia is still linked with a long European libertarian tra-
dition, and through it the State’s power over the citizens 
is constantly challenged. This was the keynote of the 18th 
century. On the other hand, the 20th century became 
famous by producing dystopias where the individual 
is totally submitted to Leviathan’s authority. And what 
is most frightening: recent history demonstrates and 
proves the technical possibility of realization of these 
authoritarian political-juridical dystopias, which become 
less and less fictitious. It could not be different: the great 
technological advances added to the ethical disintegra-
tion that devastates our time produced visions about 
the future where law has become just an instrument of 
domination and dehumanization. It’s impossible to think 
of an universal society, fair and free, after the horrors 
of Nazi-fascist totalitarianism, which is a witness of a 
capacity of infinite cruelty, on a global scale, of what men 
can be capable of.
Bertrand Russell thinks that the contemporary 
mentality is not able to conceive as possible the societ-
ies dreamt of by a Morus, a Campanella or even a Marx; 
we have a lack of imagination – or even innocence – for 
that. A proof for this is that the typical product of the 
post-modern political-juridical deliriums – the dysto-
pias – are nothing less than an aggravation of negative 
vestiges that actually exist in concrete current societies 
(Maffey, 2000, p. 1289). Maybe losing our creative ability, 
even in nightmares, is more serious than just losing our 
ability to dream. We are forced to face our own cor-
rupted and dehumanized societies in a mirror – which 
is certainly deforming – that ultimately only shows us 
the point at which we will get. The difference between 
the world we live in and the technical-totalitarian night-
mares of the novels by Aldous Huxley (Brave new world), 
George Orwell (Nineteen eighty-four), Ray Bradbury 
(Fahrenheit 451), Anthony Burgess (A clockworck orange) 
e Philip K. Dick (A scanner darkly) is just a matter of 
level, not of nature. Let’s see what these five paradig-
matic works consist of, all of them shown on the screen, 
today’s main medium of communication. 
Dystopias at cinema
Brave new world was written by Aldous Huxley 
in 1932, and since then it has been translated into the 
main languages in the world (Huxley, 2001). The book 
was adapted and broadcast as a series by the English 
station CBS in 1956. In 1998 a film for television was 
made, remotely based on Huxley’s work. The film was 
directed by Leslie Libman, and had Peter Gallagher and 
Leonard Nimoy in the main roles. Ridley Scott prepares 
a cinematographic version of the book, with Leonardo 
DiCaprio in the cast. It certainly is the most influential 
modern dystopia, having only Nineteen eighty-four as a 
7 For a discussion of Sade’s libertarian project from the point of view of the philosophy of law, see the innovative article of Souza (2009, p. 151-156). 
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dignified rival. The plot of the film and book takes place 
in London in 2540 (632 years after Ford). What has re-
mained from civilization is commanded in an authoritar-
ian way by an elite of scientists. Huxley discusses ethical 
cases related to the development of genetic engineering 
and biotechnology. He also reflects about the possibility 
of controlling people through the use of drugs provided 
by the government. In 1958, the author launched Brave 
new world revisited (Huxley, 2000), a nonfiction essay 
where he analyses the world’s situation at that time and 
concludes that we are increasingly closer to the dys-
topic future ideated by him: overpopulated, submerged 
in drug consumption and where the masses’ obedience 
is based on many forms of underlying control.
Nineteen eighty-four, the most ambitious of 
George Orwell’s novels, was written in 1948 and pub-
lished in 1949 (Orwell, 2005). It has already been adapt-
ed three times for television and twice for cinema: in 
1956, directed by Michael Anderson, and in 1984, direct-
ed by Michael Radford. A new cinematographic version 
has been planned, directed by Tim Robbins. The book’s 
influence and popularity were huge in the pop culture 
of the 20th century. Its most well-known descendants 
are: (i) the movie called Brazil (its original title should be 
1984 ½), of 1985, directed by Terry Gilliam, which is a 
film that shows Brazil being controlled by a bureaucracy 
similar to the one that serves the Big Brother; (ii) An-
thony Burgess’ novel 1985 is more than a sequence: it is 
a homage to Orwell; (iii) and the graphic novel titled V 
for vendetta, by Allan Moore, presenting a vision of a fas-
cist England where homosexuals, Arab and black people 
have been extirpated from society. This work has re-
cently got a filmed version in a loyal adaptation by the 
Wachowski brothers, who are creators of another cin-
ematographic dystopia, Matrix, which today is a cult film. 
Fahrenheit 451 is a science fiction novel by Ray 
Bradbury, an uncontested master in this genre (Brad-
bury, 2009). Published in 1953, the work portrays a fu-
turistic, hedonistic and anti-social America dominated 
by television where books are prohibited, just like every 
critical thought. The main character, Guy Montag, is a 
fireman who rebels against the system and begins to 
keep and read the books he should burn. The novel’s cu-
rious title refers to the degree at which the paper used 
for printing undergoes combustion. The poetic end of 
the story is one of the book’s highlights. It was directed 
by the French director François Truffaut in 1966. There 
are plans for a new movie directed by Frank Darabont. 
For him, Bradbury’s work is more up to date than it 
had been before in the United States of America that 
George W. Bush gave us.
A clockwork orange, Anthony Burgess’ master-
piece, was published in 1962 and filmed by Stanley Ku-
brick in 1971 (Burgess, 2004). The plot is set in England 
in the year 2017 and narrates in first person the adven-
tures and misadventures of Alex, a young sociopath aged 
15 who, after arrested, is submitted to a governmental 
rehabilitation program called “the Ludovico technique”. 
This program – in fact a therapy of a Pavlovian kind – 
consists of a long exposition of criminals to images of 
extreme violence, at the same time that as they ingest 
drugs that cause strong nausea. At the end of the treat-
ment, Alex is unable to watch any acts of sex or vio-
lence. Moreover, he develops aversion to classical music, 
which he used to love, because one of the films present-
ed during the process of “re-education” included as its 
soundtrack the Ode to joy of Beethoven’s 9th symphony.
The book and the film A scanner darkly were 
launched in Brazil with a title of doubtful taste, The 
double man. Written in 1977 by Philip K. Dick, the work 
portrays the futuristic California of 1994 (Dick, 2007). 
In Dick’s apocalyptic vision, the United States of Amer-
ica have lost the war against drugs and suffers from an 
epidemic caused by the intensive use of substance D, 
that slowly destroys the personality and intelligence of 
its users. The main themes tackled refer to the prob-
lem of individual personality and to governmental con-
trol of private life, a subject that is already classical in 
dystopias of the 20th century. The work was adapted 
for cinema in 2006 by the celebrated director Richard 
Linklater, who produced a kind of extremely refined 
cartoon using the technique of rotoscope, where the 
film’s frames serve as a basis for animation. The main 
role was given to Keanu Reeves, who played the char-
acter called Neo of the dystopical trilogy Matrix. Many 
of Dick’s science fiction novels became successful films, 
like Do androids dream of electric sheep?, of 1968, which 
became a movie in 1982, under Ridley Scott’s direction, 
with the title Blade runner. 
Dystopias in the present
We already have a Big Brother among us that 
watches us – just as described by Orwell. Day by day, 
when turning on the TV set (precursor of omnipresent 
telescreens?), reading the newspapers, connecting to the 
web, we can see the invisible action of the Truth Ministry 
that in the end convinces us that War is Peace, Liberty 
is Slavery and Ignorance is Strength. In the same way as 
the moronic characters of Huxley’s celebrated novel, we 
already consume every day our share of soma, the drug 
designed to give daily doses of cheap happiness to the 
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inhabitants of the brave new world, numbing and im-
mersing them in a colourful reality of futile desires and 
free sensations of pleasure, whereby they are turned 
docile and submissive to governmental domination. 
Talking about drugs, the pathetic, false and inefficient 
policy of global governments that, for the delight of a 
small part of the public opinion, shows us a strict, sacred 
and unquestionable crusade against drugs reminds us of 
the apocalyptic reality of A scanner darkly, of Philip K. 
Dick, a science fiction (?) novel where the government, 
at the same time as it combats the traffic and the use 
of drugs, produces and distributes them through a com-
pany whose true owner is the State. On the other hand, 
the State turns into addicts even its own agents of pub-
lic security in a perverse system where an atmosphere 
of denunciation, suspicion and fear is predominant. The 
methods of social re-education conceived by Burgess 
in his novel and shown on the screen with great suc-
cess by Stanley Kubrick transformed the transgressor 
Alex, previously interested only in rape, ultra-violence 
and Beethoven, into a peaceful and responsible citizen, 
unable to practice any act of violence, so much so that 
he feels nausea and faints when he tries to defend him-
self from the action of some criminals, old fellows from 
his times of débauche. Well, isn’t this the keynote of 
the most “advanced” criminal justice structures of the 
planet, which intend to force a man to be “good” – re-
socializing him, the criminalists say – to dump him in a 
world which continues to be “bad”?
 Orwell anticipated the logic of submission 
and control in newspeak, a kind of universal language 
created in a lab. It should slowly replace oldspeak (the 
English) in the imaginary State of Oceania, where Or-
well’s dystopia is located. Newspeak would be of an 
extreme poverty and simplicity and is incapable of 
expressing any deeper thought. With the progressive 
imposition of this new language, people would lose the 
ability to think and rebel against the system because 
they would no longer have a linguistic means capable 
of expressing complex thoughts. Communication, then, 
would be reduced to what is barely necessary for sur-
vival. The ideal of newspeak would be to offer peo-
ple an increasingly smaller number of words, whose 
meanings are increasingly restricted, so that it would 
be impossible to express meanings different from the 
will of the government’s party. For example: the words 
“free” and “equal” would exist, but they would never 
evoke the liberty of thought or equal rights, as these 
subjective situations had already ceased to exist many 
generations ago in Oceania. It would be impossible to 
translate to newspeak the beginning of the American 
Declaration of Independence, where it is stated that 
there are some rights that are inalienable, such as life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that the gov-
ernment’s role is to guarantee them, otherwise it would 
be toppled and replaced by another by the people, the 
only holder of political power. The closest translation 
in newspeak would be the replacement of this whole 
section by a single word in newspeak: thoughtcrime 
(Orwell, 2005, p. 299-300). Well, isn’t newspeak par-
tially present in the newspapers and mass media, which 
are always committed to power? In the empty speech 
of our political representatives and in the childish dec-
larations of figures – like George Bush – who want to 
make us believe that the United States of America have 
the sacred mission of combating evil wherever it is, in 
a kind of planetary Wild West movie where Americans 
are the sheriffs? 
In relation to culture, we have already surpassed 
Huxley’s and Bradbury’s dark dreams. These novelists 
imagined a future where books, because they contain 
subversive ideas that threaten stability and social peace, 
are prohibited and mercilessly destroyed by the State. 
Nowadays we don’t need Bradbury’s firemen, whose 
ironic paradoxical mission was not to combat fires, but 
to provoke them by burning books. There’s no need to 
fear a savage like Huxley’s main character, whose huge 
crime was to read Shakespeare in a society that had 
already lost the human pains and joys concentrated in 
the verses of the English bard. The form of domination 
to which we are submitted is much more subtle and 
efficient. We are taken to believe that culture, in broad 
terms, won’t bring us any advantages: to have is much 
more important than to be and to know. To have is 
to own power, and economic ambitions override any 
consideration about ethics or aesthetics. It’s not nec-
essary to prohibit or to burn books in a society that 
despises them. 
It’s specially remarkable that in the bigger dys-
topias of the 20th century the taste for culture, art or 
science is associated to personalities who are taken as 
degenerated, always ready to challenge the valid social 
order, seen as people to be re-educated, which includes 
primarily the extinction of their cultural tendencies. 
Alex, Burgess’ anti-hero, is an extremely violent socio-
path who respects one single thing in his life: the music 
of Beethoven, the “divine Ludwig”. The main character 
of Nineteen eighty-four, Winston Smith, feels displaced 
when faced with the culturally poor and homogeniz-
ing situations he is forced to submit to and discovers 
himself as a free man – and, just because of that, as a 
rebel against the Big Brother’s authority – only when 
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he gets in touch with a prohibited book he was greedily 
looking for, Theory and practice of oligarchical collectivism, 
a kind of political-sociological essay authored by Em-
manuel Goldstein, who is supposed to be the leader of 
resistance. On the other hand, the savage of Brave new 
world astonishes people with demonstrations of joy, af-
fection, rage and sadness, emotions that he learned by 
reading Shakespeare’s works. At the same time, they 
were really unknown and terrifying in Huxley’s aseptic 
reality. A rapist who idolizes Beethoven? A rebel whose 
great crime is to read and to write? A savage who re-
cites Victorian poetry? The message in these archetypes 
seems very clear: culture and wisdom are dangerous; 
move away from them as quickly as you can. If you want 
to be accepted by others, get dumb. If you don’t want 
to be a loser, surrender yourself to the (dis)tastes of 
the majority. It dictates what is beautiful, good, correct 
and safe. The rest – Beethovens, political-sociological 
essays, Shakespeares etc. – is dangerous, useless stuff 
that interests only problematic nutjobs who, sooner or 
later, will surrender to the moral and social standard of 
decent people. This is the destiny that the extreme de-
humanization of technical legal orders reserves to high 
intelligence. This is not surprising: true culture, which is 
contestatory by nature, has always generated fear, dis-
comfort and repulse among ignorant masses inebriated 
by the system’s small advantages, such as handouts given 
by the State to poor people or such as the consumer 
goods artificially imposed on the middle or upper class, 
seen as necessary things for a “normal” life: the fash-
ionable cellphones, clothes of the season’s brand, the 
most powerful iPod, the coolest nightclub, the most 
chic restaurant, depending on opinion or age. In fact, we 
don’t have to go to the dystopic novels. It’s enough to 
remember Goebbel’s speech, Hitler’s propaganda min-
ister who confessed that he grabbed his weapon every 
time he heard the word “culture”. And what can we say 
about desperate Ulrich, a character of the polyphonic 
The man without qualities, Robert Musil’s greatest novel? 
In the thirteenth chapter of the first part of this huge 
encyclopedia of irony, Ulrich, a typical Austrian aca-
demic of the beginning of the 20th century, a half-nihilist, 
a half-Epicurean and half-mixture of these two things 
with nothing, gets surprised when reading a newspaper. 
It remarks that a certain racehorse had been classified 
as genial. Ulrich had already seen boxing fighters and 
soccer players being honored with this adjective that 
was previously reserved to people like Da Vinci, Mozart, 
Dostoievski; but the fact that now it can define a race-
horse too – a company more than adequate for soccer 
players – seems to him a sign of the times (Musil, 2006, 
p. 63). This chapter of Musil’s book is set in 1913, was 
written in the 1920s and published in 1930, in Austria. 
What would Ulrich say nowadays in Brazil, where the 
poor and savorless cultural supplements of the most 
important newspapers are nothing compared with the 
portentous large sports section? It really is a sign of the 
times. Of the dystopians times.       
Man’s ability to do evil to his peers is infinite. 
This is one of our basic traits, that we reluctantly qualify 
as “human”. However, whether if we like the dark side 
we have or not, we should learn to live together along 
each other in a reality that potentiates the best traits 
we have. In this context, the law plays an important 
role, as it can be used as a catalyst both of utopias and 
dystopias. The fact that nowadays the law is being used 
more clearly for authoritarian dystopic purposes dem-
onstrates how we have perverted it. By its own histori-
cal substance, Western juridical experience is related 
to the realization of liberty as a supreme value. From 
the Law of the Twelve Tables of 451/450 B.C., which 
consolidated the Roman republic, to the Magna Charta 
that the feudal barons imposed on the King John of 
England in 1215; from the Edict of the Emperor Cara-
calla in 212, which extended Roman citizenship to all of 
the empire’s inhabitants, to the American Declaration 
of Independence of 1776, the movement of Western 
law pursues the achievement of liberty, a process that 
finds, from the formal and material point of view, its nec 
plus ultra in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen, in the French Revolution of 1789. Bobbio 
asserts that the problem of our times is not the justifi-
cation of the fundamental rights – a task that basically 
accomplished in the Enlightenment Era –, but primarily 
their implementation (Bobbio, 2004). In view of this sit-
uation, it seems urgent to us to retrieve what there is of 
human in the law, which doesn’t mean that it should be 
unconnected from the technical-formal demands that 
characterizes it as a central order of coercion. Con-
temporary law must free itself from the subterranean 
chains that involve and degrade it, reducing it to a role 
of supporting irresponsible political practices validating 
the supposedly necessary dictates of global economy. 
Nothing that is inherent to humans can be disregarded 
by the law, because it is a human instrument for solv-
ing conflicts that are equally human. The law must not 
lose itself as a technical self-reproduction of empty and 
alienating procedures. Otherwise, “liberty”, “citizen” or 
even “rights” will be illegal words, not translatable to 
the newspeak of a new world that is not brave at all. 
Then, the path will be opened for the Big Brother, a 
path without return to slavery.
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